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The intellectual stakes at issue in this symposium are very high: Donald P. Green,
Soo Yeon Kim, and David H. Yoon apply their proposed methodologicalprescrip-
tions and conclude that a key ￿ nding in the ￿ eld of internationalrelations is wrong:
democracy “has no effect on militarized disputes.”
1 Green, Kim, and Yoon are
mainly interested in convincing scholars about their methodologicalpoints and see
themselves as having no stake in the resulting substantive conclusions. Their
methodologicalpoints, however, are also high stakes claims: if correct, their claims
would invalidate the vast majority of statistical analyses of military con￿ ict ever
conducted.
Green, Kim, and Yoon say they “make no attempt to break new ground
statistically,” but, as we will see, this both understates their methodological
contribution to the ￿ eld and misses some unique features of their application and
data in international relations. On the latter, Green, Kim, and Yoon’s critics are
united: John R. Oneal and Bruce Russett conclude that Green, Kim, and Yoon’s
method “produces distorted results,” and show even in Green, Kim, and Yoon’s
framework how democracy’s effect can be reinstated.
2Nathaniel Beck and Jonathan
N. Katz are even more unambiguous:“Green, Kim, and Yoon’s conclusion,in Table
3, that variables such as democracy have no paci￿c impact, is simply nonsense. . . .
Green, Kim, and Yoon’s [methodological] proposal . . . is never a good idea.”
3
The symposium participants deserve many thanks for putting up with my relentless questions in good
humor. I also appreciate their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article. The editors of IO were
also very helpful.Thanks also to Ethan Katz for superb research assistance and helping me think through
these issues, to the National Science Foundation (SBR-9729884, SBR-9753126, and IIS-9874747), the
National Institutes ofAging(PO1 A617625-01),and the World Health Organization for research support,
and to Joanne Gowa for spotting an error in an earlier draft.
1. Green, Kim, and Yoon 2001 (this issue). They also ￿ nd surprising conclusions in the area of
bilateral trade, but there is much less disagreement among the symposium participants about the methods
involved in this issue. I shall not discuss it further.
2. Oneal and Russett 2001 (this issue).
3. Beck and Katz 2001 (this issue).
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claims. The procedure I followed was to engage in extensive discussions with the
participants, including joint reanalyses provoked by our discussions and passing
computer program code (mostly with Monte Carlo simulations) back and forth to
ensure we were all talking about the same methods and agreed with the factual
results. I learned a great deal from this process and believe that the positions of the
participants are now a lot closer than it may seem from their written statements.
Indeed, I believe that all the participants now agree with what I have written here,
even though they would each have different emphases (and although my believing
there is agreement is not the same as there actually being agreement!).
Green, Kim, and Yoon’s Contribution
To understand the issues, we must separate the problem identi￿ed by Green, Kim,
and Yoon from their proposed solution. The problem is unambiguous and monu-
mentally important to this literature. It has not before been addressed in any detail,
and Green, Kim, and Yoon deserve substantial credit for focusing our attention on
it. I will describe the same issue in three ways:
1. Unlike, say, simple random survey sampling, dyadic observations in inter-
national con￿ict data have complex dependence structures. In a survey, ob-
servations 1 and 2 are two people who almost surely have never met and
have no relationship. In contrast, in dyadic data, observation 1 may be
U.S.-Iraq; observation 2, U.S.-Iran; and observation 3, Iraq-Iran. The depen-
dence among these separate observations is complicated, central to our the-
ories and the international system, critical for our methodological analyses,
and ignored by most previous researchers. In addition, each of these dyads
is observed over time, making for time-series cross-sectional data, which
introduce other dependence issues.
2. An important but often unstated assumption in many statistical analyses is
exchangeability. Roughly, this means that after taking into account the ex-
planatory variables, one should not expect to be able to predict or explain
con￿ict any better by knowing the names of the dyads. Since the explana-
tory variables normally available in international con￿ ict data are neither
powerful nor even adequate summaries of our qualitative knowledge, ex-
changeability is usually violated. That is, even knowing contiguity, capabil-
ity ratios, growth, alliance status, democracy, trade/GDP, and lagged dis-
putes, we would probably expect the Iran-Iraq dyad to be more belligerent
than the U.S.-Mexico dyad. (Exchangeability is what enables us to use
many observations to reduce our uncertainty in making a small number of
inferences; it is the assumption that area studies scholars are implicitly cri-
tiquing when they point out the uniqueness of each individual case.)
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ability, causes two statistical problems. At best, if this heterogeneity is un-
related to democracy (or whatever one’s causal variable), then only stan-
dard errors and other assessments of uncertainty are biased.
4 This is
serious, but more serious problems occur when heterogeneity is correlated
with the key causal variable, and if so, estimates of the key quantities of
interest will be biased. In fact, this is what is known in other contexts as
“omitted variable bias.” For example, suppose a degree of antipathy exists
between pairs of countries, based on cultural, historical, or personal animos-
ities, that has not been measured. (For example, completely accounting for
problems between India and Pakistan by the usual list of annual dyadic
variables we have measured seems unlikely.) The “historical animosity”
variable is (1) unmeasured, probably (2) causally prior to and (3) correlated
with democracy, and (4) affects the probability of con￿ict—precisely the
conditions for large omitted variable biases.
5
All the participants recognize the central importance of Green, Kim, and
Yoon’s methodological criticisms. Indeed, Beck and Katz write, “We close by
agreeing with Green, Kim, and Yoon that the assumption of complete homogene-
ity of data, across both units and time, is usually suspect.” Few of us regard tests
such as those performed by Green, Kim, and Yoon as determinative, but they do
provide some empirical evidence about the existence of heterogeneity, its correla-
tion with democracy and the other explanatory variables, and hence the strong
likelihood of bias. The issue is whether the particular approach to the problem
chosen by Green, Kim, and Yoon is appropriate.
Summary of Substantive Conclusions
Green, Kim, and Yoon and, to some degree, Oneal and Russett summarize their
empirical analyses with raw logistic regression results, which are dif￿ cult to
interpret directly and in my view should not be attempted.
6For the results from their
pooled model, Oneal and Russett report a “￿ rst difference,” which is the increase in
the probabilityof con￿ ict that results from a speci￿ ed increase in democracy.Unlike
raw logit results, the ￿ rst difference is indeed of substantive interest and may even
be the ultimate quantity of interest to be reported for the effects of democracy.
Unfortunately, ￿ rst differences, and indeed every quantity of interest but one, are
impossible to compute correctly from estimates of the ￿ xed-effects model. This is
4. Strictly speaking, this is true only if the model is linear. In versions of logistic regression, the
technique of choice in this literature for binary outcome variables, coef￿ cients can also be biased even
if unmeasured heterogeneity is unrelated to the key causal variable. However, the degree of a problem
will normally be considerably less with independence.
5. For example, King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 170.
6. There is never a reason to do so; see King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000.
Pooling Dyads in IR Data 499a very serious ￿ aw in the ￿ xed-effects model and one that I discuss further here.
(The “￿ xed-effects model” ￿ rst differences reported by Oneal and Russett in their
Tables 2 and 3 are computed incorrectly, and no appropriate correction could be
computed.) The one quantity of interest that can be computed from the ￿ xed-effects
model is the relative risk, which is used sometimes in internationalcon￿ict studies.
7
Journalists also frequently report relative risks in medical research—for example,
that the use of some drug doubles the probability of cancer. In the present context,
the relative risk is the proportionate increase in the probability of con￿ict when the
democracy variable changes from 5 (moderately democratic) to –5 (moderately
undemocratic). Although relative risks were not computed by any of the partici-
pants, I have done so in Table 1 for all their quantities so that we might get some
sense of the substantive conclusions resulting from their analyses.
8
The ￿ rst row of Table 1 gives the relative risk for something close to the standard
speci￿ cationin the literature.This ￿ gure indicatesthat decreasing democracy nearly
doubles the probability of a dispute. More precisely, the probability of a dispute
7. Bennett and Stam 1998.
8. Since the population fraction of con￿ icts is very small, then e
(D12 D0)b d approximates the relative
risk, where D0 and D1 are values chosen to change democracy from and to, respectively, and b D is the
corresponding logistic regression slope coef￿ cient. I computed these relative risks from the numbers in
the participants’ tables and so did not compute standard errors, which requires reanalyses of their data;
see King and Zeng forthcoming.
TABLE 1. Alternative estimates of the relative risks of nondemocracy
Analysis Sample frame Author Relative risk
Pooled 1951–92 Green, Kim, and Yoon 2001 1.8
Pooled with dynamics 1951–92 Green, Kim, and Yoon 2001 1.7
Fixed effects 1951–92 Green, Kim, and Yoon 2001 1.0
Fixed effects with dynamics 1951–92 Green, Kim, and Yoon 2001 1.0
Pooled with dynamics 1885–1992 Oneal and Russett 2001 1.7
Fixed effects 1885–1992 Oneal and Russett 2001 1.4
Fixed-effects vector autoregression 1885–1992 Oneal and Russett 2001 1.7
Fixed effects 1951–65 King and Zeng
a .9
Fixed effects with dynamics 1951–65 King and Zeng
a .7
Fixed effects 1965–85 King and Zeng
a .8
Fixed effects with dynamics 1965–85 King and Zeng
a .8
Fixed effects 1985–92 King and Zeng
a 6.0
Fixed effects with dynamics 1985–92 King and Zeng
a 6.8
Note: Each entry is an estimate of the proportionate increase in the probability of military con￿ ict
resulting from a decrease in democracy from 5 to 2 5.
aUnpublished analyses by myself and Langche Zeng.
500 International Organizationincreases by 1.8 times, or, in otherwords, by 80 percent.The secondrow in the table
shows that the relative risk changes relatively little when time-series dependence is
taken into account. The second pair of rows in the ￿ rst panel display Green, Kim,
and Yoon’s central substantive ￿ nding: when they add three ￿ xed effects, the
relative risk of democracy drops to 1.0, which is no effect at all. The second panel
in the table portrays Oneal and Russett’s results. They ￿ rst extend the time series
back to 1885, run the classic pooled analysis, and ￿ nd an effect approximately like
the same effect in Green, Kim, and Yoon’s shorter time series. In the longer time
series, their ￿ xed-effects regression causes the 1.7 relative risk to decline only to 1.4
rather than to be eliminated entirely. And with dynamics through their vector
autoregression approach, relative risk recovers its original value. Dropping such a
large fraction of the observations increases the inef￿ciency (variance) of the
￿ xed-effects results; Oneal and Russett’s approach recovers some of this lost
variance with additionalobservations. The cost here, of course, is a much stronger,
and more dif￿cult to defend, exchangeability assumption. Of course, Oneal and
Russett do not trust the ￿ xed-effects analysis,with or without the longer time series,
and only performed these analyses to show that the effect for democracy could even
be recovered in that more dif￿cult, and perhaps inappropriate, context.
Finally, I make Green, Kim, and Yoon’s point in anotherway by examiningtheir
model in different subperiods of their data.
9 The last panel of Table 1 shows that in
the periods 1951–65 and 1965–85 there is essentially no effect of democracy (the
point estimate indicates that decreasing democracy even slightly reduces the
probability of con￿ict), but the relative risk is much larger in the period 1985–92:
the probability in that period increases by a factor of six or more when democracy
decreases.
Taken together, these results indicate very substantial unmeasured time-series
heterogeneity. Some additional analyses conducted by Oneal and Russett on their
data, resultingfrom our discussionsof these results,providesome additionalsupport
for an increasing effect of democracy over a longer period of time. However, their
research and mine (not shown) indicate that using the pooled model, the effect of
democracy seems much more, even though not entirely, stable. This is an important
topic for future research: if the international system has changed in this massive a
way, can we identify the substantive variable that accounts for the change so that
exchangeabilitystill holds and we can still use all the data to draw our inferences?
The results in Table 1 are of some interest, but relative risks in all ￿ elds in which
they are used are regarded as inadequate for understanding statistical results. For
example, a relative risk of 2 could summarize a change in probability from 1 in a
billionto 2 in a billionor from 0.4 to 0.8. In otherwords, thesame relativerisk could
indicate a result that is substantively irrelevant or vitally important. The only way
to know the difference would be to estimate a ￿ rst difference, marginal effect, or the
9. Langche Zeng and I found these results when looking for an example for a different paper. We
used the replication data set made available by Green, Kim, and Yoon, which ensures that we had the
same data as the participants.
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explanatory variables. Unfortunately,with the methods offered by Green, Kim, and
Yoon, these more interesting quantities cannot be computed.
Methodological Evaluation
If we had a good measure of the omitted variable that caused the unmeasured
heterogeneity, such as historical animosity, and it has the characteristics I describe
in the ￿ rst section, including it in the usual pooled logit equations as an extra
variable would greatly improve our analyses.In addition,measuring this variable,or
whatever is the substantive variable underlying the unmeasured heterogeneity,is by
far the best strategy to address the problem at hand.
Unfortunately, apart from new data collection efforts, our options are normally
quite limited when it comes to omitted variable bias. Remarkably, however,
information about the unmeasured heterogeneity can often be gleaned from time-
series cross-sectional data, and corrections can sometimes be made, without new
measurements. That is the promise of Green, Kim, and Yoon’s ￿ xed-effects
regressions: The theory is that by controlling for a set of dyad-level indicator
variables, all dyad-speci￿c heterogeneity is controlled, including otherwise unmea-
sured variables such as historical animosity. The intended result is that with the
omitted variable effectively in the analysis, the bias would vanish.
Suppose the only potential problem for an analysis is unmeasured heterogeneity.
Whether the outcome variable is continuous or binary, a very large number of
informativeobservationsfor each cross-sectional unit (not merely a large number of
observations) is suf￿ cient to ensure that including￿ xed effects will be an improve-
ment over the usual pooled binary logit model.
10 In neither the continuous nor the
binary case will ￿ xed effects necessarilybe an optimalapproach,even thoughit will
normally help remove some of the omitted variable problem as compared to
ordinary pooled logit.
The issue is whetherthe￿ xed-effects model works in the present case, which does
not meet these criteria. In (binary) rare events data like these, the amount of
information in the data depends not only on the number of observations but also on
the rareness of events.
11 Although Green, Kim, and Yoon have (at most) forty-two
observations per dyad, each contains very little information. Indeed, the dependent
variable is a constant for most of the dataset: 2,877 of the 3,075 dyads have no
disputes at all and so have all-zeros for every annual observation. Of the 198
remaining dyads, 116 have only one dispute (a string of zeros with only a single
one).
10. Beck and Tucker 1996.
11. King and Zeng forthcoming.
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the center of the present controversy. The issue is that the ￿ xed-effects model is
“inestimable” with all-zero dyads. A model that is inestimable (also known as “not
identi￿ed”) cannot be estimated no matter how good the data are. The problem is
that the dyad-level indicator variables corresponding to the all-zero dyads perfectly
predict the zeros in the outcome variable. And although it might seem that perfect
prediction is one of those problems that political scientists would love to deal with,
it wreaks havoc with the logit model.
Consequently,oneneedsto take some other action,and there are two possibilities,
depending on how you conceptualize the data and model. The differences between
these strategies (each of which is a different estimator of the same model) are small
in practice, but explicatingthe differences helps in understandingthe problems with
both.
Perhaps the more intuitive method is known as the ￿xed-effects logit estimator.
The idea here is to drop the all-zero dyads and correspondingindicatorvariablesand
run the analysis on the observations and variables that remain. When there is a lot
of information in each dyad that remains, the coef￿cients on democracy and the
other substantive variables are estimated consistently, although the coef￿cients on
the remaining indicator variables are biased. This strategy is not satisfactory for
several reasons. Not only is there bias in estimates of the remaining indicator
variables and, of course, no estimates on the excluded indicator variables; there is
also probablynot enoughinformationin what remains to estimate the coef￿cientson
democracy (and the other substantive variables) well. Unless the number of time
periods were much larger and/or events were much less rare, this estimator would
produce statistically inconsistent estimates of all slope coef￿cients. In addition,
consistent estimates of all the coef￿cients on all the variables (including those
omitted)are required in order to computequantitiesof interest otherthan the relative
risk, and so the ￿ xed-effects logitmodel in the presence of all-zero dyads cannot get
us what we need.
The other strategy, which was adopted by Green, Kim, and Yoon and Oneal and
Russett, is Chamberlain’s logit estimator, also sometimes known as clogit.
12 This
procedure works by giving up entirely the goal of estimating the coef￿cients on the
indicator variables. (Clogit estimates the logit coef￿cients in the same model as the
￿ xed-effects logit model, but it is a different estimator, requiring a specialized
computationalprocedure,such as exists in Stata.) Clogit conceptualizesthe problem
by asking in each dyad whether there will be a dispute in each year, assuming
knowledge of how many disputes there were during the entire observation period.
Assuming knowledge of the future (that is, “the entire observation period”) to
understand the past in this way is hard to justify, even if the goal has nothing to do
with forecasting. Although clogit makes sense in other applications (such as two
spouses in each of many families), the present application really does not ￿ t the
12. Chamberlain 1980.
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that no quantity of interest other than relative risk can be computed. The all-zero
dyads get dropped in this approach as well, since once one knows that no con￿icts
have occurred, there is no uncertainty about whether a con￿ ict occurred in any one
year.
In both approaches, dropping the all-zero dyads is thus an expedient approach
from a methodological perspective enabling one to estimate at least some of the
necessary parameters, but the procedure can be interpreted from a substantive
perspectiveas well. Oneal and Russett explainthe dilemma: “It is simply impossible
to think that the 97,150 annual observations of the experiences of the 2,751 dyads
that managed to live in peace—84 percent of our total number of cases—tell us
nothing about the causes of war.” Unfortunately, this assumption is a consequence
of choosing either the clogit estimator or the ￿ xed-effects logit estimator. If you
regard the dyadicindicatorvariablesas a causal consequenceof democracy (and the
other substantive variables), then the model assumes that there are no substantive
explanatory variables that could ever account for why the U.S.-Canada dyad is at
peace or why it is more at peace than the Iran-Iraq dyad. If, however, you regard the
dyadic indicators as causally prior to democracy, then the model assumes that it is
impossible to identify a substantive variable that intermediates between, and thus
accounts for, the indicator variables and peace. Either way, the famous comparative
politics dictum of “getting rid of proper nouns” is not only something that was not
achieved in the Green, Kim, and Yoon analysis, but is also impossible to achieve
under the proposed model, no matter how much our data collectionefforts improve.
In their concluding section, Green, Kim, and Yoon appropriately suggest avoiding
this problem altogether by searching for better substantive covariates that would
enable researchers to control for the heterogeneity without the dyad-level indicator
variables. Getting better data is usually the best advice, and it clearly is here. Green,
Kim, and Yoon also suggesta sequenceof tests and proceduresthat might aid in this
goal.
Concluding Suggestions: Clean Pools of Salamanders
So where are we? Green, Kim, and Yoon have identi￿ed unmeasured heterogeneity
as a critical methodological problem that has not been addressed previously. Their
proposed solution is not really adequate to the task at hand, even though it served
them well in demonstrating how much the standard results change when they alter
some implausibleassumptionsthe ￿ eld has taken for granted.So we have a problem
and no solution. That is a problem for international relations, but an important
opportunity for some enterprising methodologists out there. I conclude with some
suggestions for researchers in international relations doing research now, and for
methodologists working to improve future applied con￿ict research.
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Since they can get better data, substantivelyorientedresearchers almost alwayshave
better tools to solve methodologicalproblems than methodologists.They only need
remember that suf￿ ciently good data beats better methods every time. This is an
important aphorism for con￿ict research and one that researchers in this ￿ eld seem
to understand, at least to a degree. Indeed, over the last several decades, consider-
able effort has gone into cataloging and categorizing every manner of international
dispute.
Unfortunately, even though our databases have hundreds of thousands of obser-
vations, they still contain relatively little information, making inference dif￿cult.
The low information contentof our data does not necessarilyindicatethatour efforts
are ￿ awed, since data collection strategies cannot create information where none
exists. The rareness of internationaldisputesis merely a fact about the world that we
need to cope with. Surely investing additional effort into re￿ nements in de￿nitions
and measurements of “militarized interstate disputes” and other similar concepts
seems wise, but there is a limit to this strategy. More fertile ground for learning
about internationalcon￿ict is better found in trying to improve our set of measured
explanatory variables. The covariates available to explain and predict international
con￿ict, both those that are the subject of causal inference and those used as control
variables, are very crude measures of underlyingconstructs, and they exclude many
concepts altogether. The split between quantitative and qualitative researchers may
be more severe in this ￿ eld than in any otherin politicalscience,and the validityand
comprehensivenessof our explanatory variables may be the most important reason.
Green, Kim, and Yoon’s argument about unmeasured heterogeneity (or equiva-
lently, about omitted variable bias) can be solved easily with better measures of
more appropriate control variables. Indeed, redoubling our efforts to ￿ nd these
measures would be the most important action con￿ict researchers could take in
response to this symposium. If the new measures are not available (yet), then we
must recognize that pooled analyses risk omitted variable bias. Unfortunately,
￿ xed-effects models in the context of rare events data, like those in international
con￿ict, do not enable us to apply a methodological ￿ x to get around this omitted
variable bias problem. But this does not let anyone off the hook, since bias does not
vanish just because we lack a solution.
Fortunately, even when we are convinced of the potential for omitted variable
bias, and have some idea what the omitted variable is, but we have no measure of
it,some actioncan stillbe taken.As shown by King, RobertO. Keohane,and Sidney
Verba, the direction of the bias can be ascertained.
13 To continue with my running
example, suppose democracy is the key explanatory variable and historical animos-
ity is the omitted explanatory variable. In the linear case (which is usually
appropriate to use as an analogy for the logit case, even though it is not exact and
can be wrong in some instances), instead of estimating the effect of democracy, by
13. King, Keohane, and Verba 1994.
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Thisbiasterm is theproductof two factors—the correlation between democracyand
historical animosity, and the effect of historical animosity on the probability of a
dispute. Even though we do not have a measure of this omitted variable, it seems
reasonable to conclude that dyads with high levels of historical animosity have
lower levels of democracy, and so the correlation is negative. Similarly, it is likely
that increasing historical animosity producesa higher probabilityof a con￿ict. Thus,
the bias is the product of a negative number and a positive number and so is itself
negative. This means that instead of estimating the effect of democracy, which is
hypothesized to be negative, we are actually estimating the effect plus a negative
bias term. This, in turn, means that we are estimating something too small (that is,
too large a negative number) or, in other words, that democracy reduces the effect
of war less than indicated by the pooled analysis.Put in yet another way, this means
that if we had measured and controlledfor historicalanimosity,and our assumptions
are correct, then the effect of democracy would be smaller than indicated by the
pooled analysis.
Of course, this example only gives a taste of the kinds of analysis that could be
done even without better measures. A full analysis in the context of a real
application should follow the main point learned from this symposium and system-
aticallysearch out and documentwhat the omittedvariablesare. At best, they should
then be measured and controlled for. At worst the direction of the bias induced
should be ascertained and reported. Until better data or improved methods are
available,it is hard to see why we should not expect this type of work to accompany
every subsequent analysis using international con￿ict data.
Suggestions for Political Methodologists
A logical methodologicalstarting point for addressing the problems at hand would
be based on Bayesian hierarchical,random effects, or split populationmodels. Beck
and Katz cite several examples of these models. Just like the ￿ xed-effects logit
model, these represent compromises between the extreme of the pooled logit model
and the “equation-by-equation” extreme where a separate analysis would be run on
the time series in each dyad.Unlike ￿ xed effects, all these analysesare probabilistic.
They borrow strength statisticallyfrom similar dyads to help estimate the quantities
of interest in each one. An advantage of these approaches is that they should not
require dropping the all-zero dyads.
However, the standard hierarchical models in this area have two features that
should be changed. First, most models assume that the unobserved, but estimated,
heterogeneity is independent of democracy (and the other substantive variables).
Assuming independencewould assume away the omitted variable bias problem and
would ￿ x nothing. Fortunately, it is not dif￿cult to change this assumption, but it
must be done.
Second, an approach that extracts the most information will likely be one that
directly models the unique structure of dyadic data. Unfortunately, no off-the-shelf
506 International Organizationmodel is available for these data, but there is a close analogy in the statistical
literature on salamander mating experiments that might help a methodologist build
one. These researchers isolate each pair of male and female salamanders and see
whether they mate, and they repeat the process for all possible pairs. The structure
of the data is quite similar: dyadic data with complex dependency structures and
with a binary outcome variable. Although there are some methodological differ-
ences (countries are not male and female, events in salamander mating are not as
rare as in international con￿ict, and the longer time series in con￿ict data must be
considered), but the structure of the necessary statisticalmodels are quite similar. In
fact, some of their models have a structure similar to that suggested by Nathaniel
Beck and Richard Tucker.
14
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